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Abstract
The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development 
issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the 
names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those 
of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and 
its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent.
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This paper discusses Islamic banking products and 
interprets them in the context of financial intermediation 
theory. Anecdotal evidence shows that many of the 
conventional products can be redrafted as Sharia-
compliant products, so that the differences are smaller 
than expected. Comparing conventional and Islamic 
banks and controlling for other bank and country 
characteristics, the authors find few significant differences 
in business orientation, efficiency, asset quality, or 
stability. While Islamic banks seem more cost-effective 
This paper—a product of the Finance and Private Sector Development Team, Development Research Group—is part of 
a larger effort in the department to understand Islamic banking and its impact. Policy Research Working Papers are also 
posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The author may be contacted at ademirguckunt@worldbank.org.  
than conventional banks in a broad cross-country sample, 
this finding reverses in a sample of countries with both 
Islamic and conventional banks. However, conventional 
banks that operate in countries with a higher market 
share of Islamic banks are more cost-effective but 
less stable. There is also consistent evidence of higher 
capitalization of Islamic banks and this capital cushion 
plus higher liquidity reserves explains the relatively better 
performance of Islamic banks during the recent crisis. 
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1. Introduction 
The current global financial crisis has not only shed doubts on the proper functioning of 
conventional “Western” banking, but has also increased the attention on Islamic banking.1  
Academics and policy makers alike point to the advantages of Shariah-compliant financial 
products, as the mismatch of short-term, on-sight demandable deposits contracts with long-term 
uncertain loan contracts is mitigated with equity elements. In addition, Sharia-compliant 
products are very attractive for segments of the population that demand financial services that are 
consistent with their religious beliefs. However, little academic evidence exists on the 
functioning of Islamic banks, as of yet.   
This paper describes some of the most common Islamic banking products and links their 
structure to the theoretical literature on financial intermediation.  Specifically, we discuss to 
which extent Islamic banking products affect the agency problems arising from information 
asymmetries between lender and borrower or investor and manager of funds. Second, we 
compare the business model, efficiency, asset quality and stability of Islamic banks and 
conventional banks, using an array of indicators constructed from balance sheet and income 
statement data. In separate regressions, we focus specifically on the relative performance of both 
bank groups during the recent crisis.     
While there is a large practitioner literature on Islamic finance, in general, and 
specifically Islamic banking, there are few academic papers. Cihak and Hesse (2010) test for the 
stability of Islamic compared to conventional banks, while Errico and Farahbaksh (1998) and 
Solé (2007)  discuss regulatory issues related to Islamic banking. This general dearth of 
academic work on Islamic finance stands in contrast with the increasing importance that Islamic 
banking has in many Muslim countries in Asia and in Africa. With this paper we hope to 
contribute to the emerging literature on this topic.  
Sharia-compliant finance does not allow for the charging of interest payments (riba) as 
only goods and services are allowed to carry a price.  On the other hand, Sharia-compliant 
                                                          
1 For just two examples, see Willem Buiter: http://blogs.ft.com/maverecon/2009/07/islamic-finance-principles-to-
restore-policy-effectiveness/ and Jerry Caprio: http://blogs.williams.edu/financeeconomics/2009/07/20/narrow-
banks-or-islamic-banks-to-the-rescue/ 
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finance relies on the idea of profit-, loss-, and risk-sharing, on both the liability and asset side.  In 
practice, however, Islamic scholars have developed products that resemble conventional banking 
products, replacing interest rate payments and discounting with fees and contingent payment 
structures.  In addition, leasing-like products are popular among Islamic banks, as they are 
directly linked to real-sector transactions. Nevertheless, the residual equity-style risk that Islamic 
banks and its depositors are taking has implications for the agency relationships on both sides of 
the balance sheet as we will discuss below.  
Comparing indicators of business orientation, cost efficiency, asset quality and stability 
of conventional and Islamic banks, we find little significant differences between the two groups. 
While we find that Islamic banks are more cost-effective in a large sample of countries, this 
advantage turns around when we focus on a sample of countries with both conventional and 
Islamic banks. Hence, it is conventional banks that are more cost-effective than Islamic banks in 
countries where both banks exist. We cannot find any significant differences in business 
orientation, as measured by the share of fee-based to total income or share of non-deposit in total 
funding. Neither do we find significant differences in the stability of Islamic banks, though we 
find that Islamic banks have higher capital-asset ratios. However, we do find some variation of 
efficiency and stability of conventional banks across countries with different market shares of 
Islamic banks. Specifically, in countries where the market share of Islamic banks is higher, 
conventional banks tend to be more cost-effective but less stable.  
Considering the performance of Islamic and conventional banks during the recent crisis, 
we find little differences, except that Islamic banks increased their liquidity holdings in the run-
up to and during the crisis relative to conventional banks. This also explains why Islamic banks’ 
stocks performed better during the crisis compared to conventional banks’ stocks. 
Together, our empirical findings suggest that conventional and Islamic banks are more 
alike than previously thought.  Differences in business models – if they exist at all – do not show 
in standard indicators based on financial statement information.  Other differences, such as cost 
efficiency, seem to be driven more by country rather than bank type differences. Finally, the 
good performance of Islamic banks during the recent crisis appears to be driven by higher 
precaution in liquidity holdings and capitalization, but no inherent difference in asset quality 
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between the two bank types. This allows two alternative conclusions, which our data do not 
allow to distinguish: off-setting effects of Sharia-compliant banking on business model, risk 
taking and ultimately stability cancel each other out, or the functioning and organization of 
Islamic banks is indeed less different from that of conventional banks than often propagated.      
This being one of the first bank-level explorations of Islamic banks, two important 
caveats are in place. First, anecdotal evidence suggests that there are significant differences 
across countries in terms of how Sharia-compliant products are exactly structured, with some of 
the banks basically offering conventional products repackaged as Sharia-compliant products.  
This implies that we need to exercise caution when interpreting Islamic banking in the context of 
traditional models of financial intermediation. In addition, there are differences across different 
Muslim countries in what is considered Sharia-compliant and what is not, which makes it 
difficult to do cross-country comparisons. Second, given the different nature of conventional and 
Sharia-compliant products, as discussed in section 2, balance sheet and income statement items 
might not be completely comparable across bank types even within the same country.   In our 
empirical exercise, we rely on Bankscope data that have been subjected to consistency checks by 
the provider VanDyck.  However, we cannot exclude the possibility that significant differences 
in ratios derived from financial statements are due to different measurement issues rather than 
inherent differences across bank types. Finally, our sample includes relatively few Islamic banks 
which might bias our findings and can only be remedied over time as more data become 
available.  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows.  Section 2 presents some of the basic 
Sharia-compliant products and links these products to the theoretical literature on financial 
intermediation.  Section 3 presents data and methodology. Section 4 uses bank-level data to 
assess the relative business orientation, efficiency, asset quality and stability of Islamic and 
conventional banks.  Section 5 compares the relative performance of conventional and Islamic 
banks during the recent crisis and section 6 concludes.  
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2. Sharia-compliant Products and Agency Problems 
Islamic or Sharia2-compliant banking products are financial transactions that do not violate 
prescriptions of the Koran. Specifically, Islamic financial transactions cannot include the interest 
payment (Riba) at a predetermined or fixed rate; rather, the Koran stipulates profit-loss-risk 
sharing arrangements, the purchase and resale of goods and services and the provision of 
(financial) services for a fee.  A second important characteristic of Islamic banks is that they are 
in general prohibited from trading in financial risk products, such as derivative products.   In 
order for banks and their clients to comply with Sharia, over the past decades, specific products 
have been developed that avoid the concept of interest and imply a certain degree of risk-sharing.  
One important feature is the pass-through of risk between depositor and borrower.  
Among the most common Islamic banking products are partnership loans between bank and 
borrowers.  Under the Mudaraba contract, the bank provides the resources, i.e. the “loan”, while 
the client – the entrepreneur – provides effort and expertise.  Profits are shared at a 
predetermined ratio, while the losses are borne exclusively by the bank, i.e. the entrepreneur is 
covered by limited liability provisions. While the entrepreneur has the ultimate control over her 
business, major investment decisions, including the participation of other investors, have to be 
approved by the bank.  The Musharaka contract, on the other hand, has the bank as one of 
several investors, with profits and losses being shared among all investors.  This partnership 
arrangement is mirrored on the deposit side, with investment accounts or deposits that do not 
imply a fixed, preset return but profit-loss sharing. Such investment deposits can be either linked 
to a bank’s profit level or to a specific investment account on the asset side of a bank’s balance 
sheet.  
An alternative is the Murabaha contract, which resembles a leasing contract in 
conventional banking.  By involving the purchase of goods, it gets around the prohibition to 
make a return on money lending. As in leasing contracts, the bank buys an investment good on 
behalf of the client and then on-sells it to the client, with staggered payments and a profit margin 
in the form of a fee. Similarly, operating leases (Ijara) where the bank keeps ownership of the 
investment good and rents it to the client for a fee are feasible financial transactions under 
                                                          
2 Sharia is the legal framework within which the public and private aspects of life are regulated for those living in a 
legal system based on fiqh (Islamic principles of jurisprudence) and for Muslims living outside the domain. 
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Sharia-law. While the discounting of IOUs and promissory notes is not allowed under Sharia-law 
as it would involve indirect interest rate payments, a similar structure can be achieved by 
splitting such an operation into two contracts, with full payment of the amount of the IOU on the 
one hand, and a fee or commission for this pre-payment, on the other hand.  
On the deposit side, one can distinguish between non-remunerated demand deposits 
(amanah), seen as depositors’ loans to the bank– thus similar to demand deposits in many 
conventional banks around the world – and savings deposits that do not carry an interest rate, but 
participate in the profits of the bank. However, according to some Islamic scholars, banks are 
allowed to pay regular bonuses on such accounts. Investment accounts, finally, and as discussed 
above, mirror the partnership loans on the asset side, by being fully involved in the profit-loss-
risk sharing arrangements of Islamic banks.  
In summary, while some of the products offered by Islamic banks are the same as in 
conventional banks (demand deposits) and other are structured in similar ways as conventional 
products (leasing products), there is a strong element of equity participation in Islamic banking.  
How do these products fit with the traditional picture of a bank as financial intermediary? 
Transaction costs and agency problems between savers and entrepreneurs have given rise to 
banks in the first place, as they can economize on the transaction costs and mitigate agency 
conflicts.   Banks face agency problems on both sides of their balance sheet, with respect to their 
depositors whose money they invest in loans and other assets and where the bank acts effectively 
as agent of depositors, and on the asset side where borrowers (as agent) use depositors’ resources 
for investment purposes.  The debt contract with deterministic monitoring (in case of default) 
(Diamond, 1984) or stochastic monitoring (Townsend, 1979) has been shown to be optimal for 
financial intermediation between a large number of savers and a large number of entrepreneurs. 
In addition, however, banks face the maturity mismatch between deposits, demandable on sight 
and long-term loans, which can result in bank runs and insolvency (Diamond and Dybvig, 1983).  
Diamond and Rajan (2002) argue that it is exactly the double agency problems banks face, with 
depositors monitoring banks that disciplines banks in turn to monitor borrowers, and government 
interventions such as deposit insurance distort such equilibrium.  
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How does the equity component of Islamic banking affect these agency problems?  On 
the one hand, the equity-like nature of savings and investment deposits might increase 
depositors’ incentives to monitor and discipline the bank. At the same token, the equity-like 
nature of deposits might distort the bank’s incentives to monitor and discipline borrowers as they 
do not face the threat by depositors of immediate withdrawal.  Similarly, the equity-like 
character of partnership loans can reduce the necessary discipline imposed on entrepreneurs by 
debt contracts (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).   
The equity character of banks’ asset-side of the balance sheet, however, might also 
increase the uncertainty on depositors’ return and increase the likelihood of both uninformed and 
informed bank runs.   This is exacerbated by the restrictions that banks face on terminating 
partnership loans or restricting them in their maturity.  
Given the agency problems that the equity character of some Islamic banking products 
might entail, Islamic banks have designed alternative contracts, where clients are allowed to 
retain profits completely until a certain level is reached, while at the same time the bank is not 
allowed to receive more than a fixed fee and the share of profits until another threshold level of 
profits is reached.  This effectively can turn a profit-loss arrangement into a debt-like instrument.  
In reality therefore, many Islamic banks offer financial products that, while being Sharia-
compliant, resemble conventional banking products.  It is unclear, however, whether they 
effectively are structured as such, thus providing the same incentive structure to depositors, 
banks and borrowers as conventional banks, or whether the equity-like character is still present, 
thus impacting the incentive structures of all parties involved.   
What do the different characteristics of Islamic and conventional banks imply for their 
relative business orientation, efficiency, asset quality, and stability?  Take first business 
orientation; the Sharia-compliant nature of Islamic bank products implies a different business 
model for Islamic banks that should become obvious from banks’ balance sheets and income 
statements. We consider three aspects: the relative shares of interest and non-interest revenue, 
the relative importance of retail and wholesale funding and the loan-deposit ratio.   On the one 
hand, there might be a higher share of non-interest revenue in Islamic banks as these banks might 
charge higher fees and commissions to compensate for the lack of interest revenue.  On the other 
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hand, the share of revenue related to non-lending and including investment bank activities should 
be significantly lower for Islamic bank.  The overall implications for the relative share of interest 
and non-interest revenues in total earnings are therefore a-priori ambiguous. Similarly, in terms 
of retail vs. wholesale funding, there is a-priori no clear difference, as Islamic banks can rely on 
market funding as much as conventional banks, as long as it is Sharia-compliant. Similarly, the 
difference in loan-deposit ratios across bank types is not clear a-priori.  
In terms of efficiency, it is a-priori ambiguous whether conventional or Islamic banks 
should be more efficient. On the one hand, monitoring and screening costs might be lower for 
Islamic banks given the lower agency problems.  On the other hand, the higher complexities of 
Islamic banking might result in higher costs and thus lower efficiency of Islamic banks. 
Differences in asset quality across Islamic and conventional banks are also a-priori, 
ambiguous, as it is not clear whether the tendency towards equity-funding in Islamic banks 
provides stronger incentives to adequately assess and monitor risk and discipline borrowers. 
Similarly, the relationship between bank type and bank stability is a-priori ambiguous. On the 
one hand, the pass-through role and risk-sharing arrangements of Islamic banks might be a risk-
reducing factor.  Specifically, interest rate risk – well known feature of any risk management tool 
and stress test of a conventional bank - should be absent from an Islamic bank. In addition, 
adverse selection and moral hazard concerns might be reduced in Islamic banks if, as discussed 
above, depositors have stronger incentives to monitor and discipline. Further, Islamic banks can 
be assumed to be more stable than conventional banks, as they are not allowed to participate in 
risk trading activities, as discussed above.   This however, also points to the importance of 
controlling for the importance of non-lending activities in conventional banks. On the other 
hand, the profit-loss financing increases the overall risk on banks’ balance sheet as they take 
equity in addition to debt risk. In addition, the equity-like nature of financing contract might 
actually undermine a bank’s stability as it reduces market discipline (Diamond and Rajan, 2002).  
Further, operational risk aspects might be higher in Islamic banks stemming from the 
complexities of Sharia law and including legal and compliance risks.   In a nutshell, it is a-priori 
not clear whether Islamic or conventional banks are more or less stable than conventional banks.  
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Summarizing, theory does not provide clear answers whether and how the business 
orientation, cost efficiency, asset quality and stability differ between conventional and Islamic 
banks. This ambiguity is exacerbated by lack of clarity whether the products of Islamic banks 
follow Sharia in form or in content. We therefore turn to empirical analysis to explore 
differences between the two bank groups.  
3. Data and Methodology 
We use data from Bankscope to construct and compare indicators of business orientation, 
efficiency, asset quality, and stability of both conventional and Islamic banks.3 We only include 
banks with at least two observations and countries with data on at least four banks. We restrict 
our sample to the largest 100 banks in terms of assets within a country so that our sample is not 
dominated by a specific country.  Finally, we eliminate outliers in all variables by winsorizing at 
the 1st and 99th percentiles. We also double check the categorization of Islamic banks in 
Bankscope with information from Islamic Banking Associations and country-specific sources.  
In our main analysis, we use two different samples, both over the period 1995 to 2007 
and thus both pre-dating the recent global financial crisis.  In the next section, we compare pre- 
and post-crisis performance of Islamic and conventional banks. The larger sample comprises 141 
countries and 2,956 banks, out of which 99 are Islamic banks.  Individual regressions, however, 
have significantly fewer observations, depending on the availability of specific variables. These 
samples include countries with (i) only conventional, (ii) only Islamic and (iii) both conventional 
and Islamic banks.  Another, smaller, sample comprises only countries with both conventional 
and Islamic banks, which allows us to control for any unobserved time-invariant effect by 
introducing country dummies.  This smaller sample includes 486 banks across 20 countries, out 
of which 89 are Islamic banks.  
In Table 1, we present data on 22 countries with both conventional and Islamic banks.4 
Specifically, we present the number of Islamic and total banks as well as the share of Islamic 
banks’ assets in total banking assets, all for 2007, the latest year in our pre-crisis sample. Further, 
we report the number of listed banks, for both Islamic and conventional banks.  On average, 
                                                          
3 We use unconsolidated data when available and consolidated if unconsolidated is not available, in order to not 
double count subsidiaries of international banks.  
4 Two countries are part of the crisis sample and are used in the analysis in Section 5. 
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Islamic banks constitute 10% of the overall banking market, in terms of assets, but ranging from 
less than one percent in Indonesia, Singapore and the UK to 51% in Yemen.  Not included in this 
table are banking systems that are completely Islamic, such as Iran.  Almost half of all Islamic 
banks in these 22 countries are listed, which is a larger share than among conventional banks.   
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics, for both the large (Panel A) and the small sample (Panel 
B), as well as correlations (Panel C). 
Figure 1 shows an increasing number of Islamic banks reporting their financial 
information to Bankscope over the sample period. Given the high, but incomplete coverage of 
Bankscope, however, we do not know whether this reflects new entry or previously existing 
Islamic banks starting to report financial information. Figure 2 suggests, subject to the same 
caveat, that the market share of Islamic banks has increased between 1995 and 2007, though not 
dramatically. While in the large sample of 141 countries, their share has approximately doubled 
from less than one percent to two percent, their share in countries with both Islamic and 
conventional banks increased from around 6% in 1995 to 16% in 2005, before dropping again.5   
We use an array of different variables to compare Islamic and conventional banks. First, 
we compare the business orientation of conventional and Islamic banks, using two indicators 
suggested by Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (2010) as well as the traditional loan-deposit ratio. 
Specifically, we explore to which extent Islamic and conventional banks are involved in fee-
based business by using the ratio of fee-based to total operating income. In our sample, the share 
of fee-based income to total income varies from 4% to 69%, with an average of 33%. We also 
consider the importance of non-deposit funding to total funding, which ranges from zero to 27% 
in our sample, with an average of 5%.The loan-to-deposit ratio varies from 21% to 126%, with a 
mean of 72%.  Focusing on our smaller samples of countries with both conventional and Islamic 
banks, we find that Islamic banks have a significantly higher share of fee income than 
conventional banks, rely more on non-deposit funding and have lower loan-deposit ratios. These 
simple correlations suggest that Islamic banks are less involved in traditional bank business – 
which relies heavily on interest-income generating loans and deposit funding. 
                                                          
5 Again, it is important to note that this variation might be due to differences in reporting intensity by conventional 
and Islamic banks. 
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Second, we use two indicators of bank efficiency. Overhead cost is our first and primary 
measure of bank efficiency and is computed as total operating costs divided total costs.  
Overhead cost varies from less than one percent to 8.3% in our sample, with an average of 3.5%.  
As alternative efficiency indicator, we use the cost-income ratio, which measures overhead costs 
relative to gross revenues, with higher ratios indicating lower levels of cost efficiency.  This 
indicator ranges from 33% to 92%, with an average of 62%. In our smaller sample, we find that 
Islamic banks have significantly higher overhead costs than conventional banks, but only 
marginally higher cost-income ratios (significant at 10% level).6 We also note that cost 
efficiency is significantly higher in our smaller sample than in the large sample.  
Third, we use three indicators of asset quality. Specifically, we use (i) loss reserves, (ii) 
loan loss provisions, and (iii) non-performing loans, all scaled by gross loans. All indicators 
decrease in asset quality. We note that there might be problems with cross-country 
comparability, due to different accounting and provisioning standards. Loan loss reserves range 
from less than one percent to 13.4%, with an average of 4.5%. Loan loss provisions range from 
less than zero to 4.7%, with a mean of 1.3%. Non-performing loans, finally, range for 0.4% to 
20.1%, with an average of 6.2%. In our smaller sample, Islamic banks have significantly lower 
loan loss reserves and non-performing loans, while there is no significant difference in loan loss 
provisions.    
Fourth, we use several indicators of bank stability. The z-score is a measure of bank 
stability and indicates the distance from insolvency, combining accounting measures of 
profitability, leverage and volatility. Specifically, if we define insolvency as a state where losses 
surmount equity (E<-) (where E is equity and  is profits), A as total assets, ROA=/A as 
return on assets and CAR = E/A as capital-asset ratio, the probability of insolvency can be 
expressed as prob(-ROA<CAR). If profits are assumed to follow a normal distribution, it can be 
shown that z = (ROA+CAR)/SD(ROA) is the inverse of the probability of insolvency. 
Specifically, z indicates the number of standard deviation that a bank’s return on assets has to 
drop below its expected value before equity is depleted and the bank is insolvent (see Roy, 1952; 
Hannan and Henwick, 1988; Boyd, Graham and Hewitt, 1993; and De Nicolo, 2000). Thus, a 
                                                          
6 We do not use the net interest margin, a standard indicator of efficiency in the financial intermediation literature 
(Beck, 2007), as Shariah prohibits the use of interest and Islamic banks should therefore do not show any interest 
revenue or cost in their financial statements.  Nevertheless, Bankscope reports both for Islamic banks. 
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higher z-score indicates that the bank is more stable.  The z-score varies from 3 to 46 in our 
sample, with an average of 17.5. In our smaller sample, Islamic banks have a significantly lower 
z-score, suggesting that they are closer to insolvency than conventional banks.  
We also consider two components of the z-score, most notably the return on assets and 
the capital-asset ratio. Return on assets varies from less than zero to 3.3% across banks and over 
time, with an average of 1.1%, while the capital-asset ratio varies from 3.6% to 25.5% across 
banks and over the sample period, with an average of 10.8%. In our smaller sample, Islamic 
banks are significantly more profitable and better capitalized than conventional banks, however, 
since their z-scores are still lower, their returns also tend to be much more volatile. 
 Finally, we use an indicator of maturity matching – the ratio of liquid assets to deposit 
and short-term funding to assess the sensitivity to bank runs. The liquidity ratio varies from to 
7% to 87%, with a mean of 37%. In the smaller sample, Islamic banks are significantly less 
liquid than conventional banks.  
To assess differences in business model, efficiency, asset quality, and stability across 
different bank types in our large sample, we run the following regression: 
Banki,j,t =  + Bi,j,t + 1Cj,t + 2Yt + Ii  + i,t  (1) 
where Bank is one of our measures of business orientation, efficiency, asset quality and bank 
stability of bank i in country j in year t, B is a vector of time-varying bank characteristics, C are 
time-varying country-factors, Y are year-fixed effects, I is a dummy taking the value one for 
Islamic banks and is a white-noise error term. We allow for clustering of the error terms on the 
bank level, i.e. correlation among the error terms across years within banks. We prefer to cluster 
on the bank- rather than country-level, as some of the countries in the large sample host 
significantly more banks than others and in our small sample we have only 20 countries. 
Simulations have shown that standard errors can be biased downwards in these two cases 
(Nichols and Schaffer, 2007).  For our smaller sample with countries that have both conventional 
and Islamic banks, we also run the following fixed effects regression: 
Banki,j,t =  + Bi,j,t + Ci*Yt + Ii  + i,t  (2) 
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where Ci*Yt are country-year-fixed effects. We thus compare Islamic and conventional banks 
within a country and a specific year. Below we also use additional specifications, including 
interacting the Islamic bank dummy with the market share of Islamic banks.  
We control for an array of time-variant bank characteristics that might confound the 
relationship between bank type, on the one hand, and business orientation, asset quality, 
efficiency and stability, on the other hand. Specifically, we control for bank size, using the log of 
total assets.  Larger banks might be more efficient due to scale economies, while the theoretical 
and empirical literature on the relationship between size and stability is ambiguous (Beck, 
Demirguc-Kunt and Levine, 2006; Beck, 2008).  They might also be more likely to engage in 
fee-based business and have easier access to wholesale markets. We include the ratio of fixed 
assets to total assets to control for the opportunity costs that arise from having non-earning assets 
on the balance sheet, as well as the share of non-interest earning assets to control for non-lending 
business of banks, which previous research has shown to affect both efficiency and stability of 
banks (Demirguc-Kunt, Laeven and Levine, 2004; Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga, 2008). In our 
large sample, total assets vary from 57 million USD to 22 billion USD, with an average of 948 
million USD. The share of fixed in total assets varies from close to zero to 5.4%, with an average 
of 1.9%. The share of non-loan earning assets in total assets ranges from 14% to 85%, with an 
average of 44%. In our smaller sample, Islamic banks are significantly smaller than conventional 
banks, have higher fixed assets, but lower non-interest earning assets.  
We would also like to control for the ownership structure of banks, but face the problem 
that the ownership dummy is not well populated in Bankscope and only reflects the current 
ownership structure. We therefore control for the ownership structure on the country level, using 
data from Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2008). The foreign bank share ranges from zero to 100%, 
while the government ownership share ranges from zero to 98%. On average, the foreign 
(government) ownership share is 35% (17%). 
In some of our regressions, we also include several country-level indicators.  Specifically, 
we include GDP per capita as indicator of economic development, GDP growth, Private Credit to 
GDP as measure of financial development and the three-bank concentration ratio.  A large 
literature has related bank concentration to both the efficiency and stability of financial systems 
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(see Berger et al, 2004 and Beck, 2008 for surveys).  Finally, we include a measure of Financial 
Freedom from the Heritage Foundation, with higher values indicating fewer restrictions imposed 
on banks and less direct government involvement in the financial system. Given the sample size, 
we have countries at all levels of economic and financial development, as well as a wide 
variation in economic growth, bank concentration and financial freedom.  
The correlations in Panel C of Table 2 confirm some of the differences between Islamic 
and conventional banks discussed above. Specifically, in the large sample, we find the Islamic 
banks rely less on non-deposit funding, have lower overhead costs and cost-income ratios, have 
higher ROAs and capital-asset ratios, are smaller, have higher fixed assets ratios and lower non-
interest earning asset ratios. In the smaller sample, however, we find that Islamic banks have a 
higher share of fee-based income, rely more on non-deposit funding, and have higher loan-
deposit ratios, lower nonperforming loans, higher overhead costs, lower z-score, higher ROAs 
and higher equity asset ratios. As in the large sample, Islamic banks are smaller and have higher 
fixed asset and lower non-interest earning asset ratios.  The different correlations can be 
explained by the very different country samples, which underlines the importance of (i) 
controlling for country factors and (ii) checking the robustness of our findings for a sample of 
countries with both Islamic and conventional banks to thus better control for confounding 
country factors.   
4. Comparing Islamic and Conventional Banks 
Table 3 Panel A reports the regression results for the larger sample of 141 countries and 2,956 
banks.  Overall, the results suggest that once the bank and country controls are included, Islamic 
banks are more efficient than conventional banks and have higher capitalization ratios, but that 
they are not significantly more or less stable, do not have significantly different business models 
and have similar asset quality. . Specifically, the results in columns (1) to (3) show that there are 
no significant differences in business orientation between Islamic and conventional banks, as the 
Islamic bank dummy enters insignificantly (at the 5% level) in the regressions of fee income, 
non-deposit funding and loan-deposit ratios. On the other hand, Islamic banks have significantly 
lower operating costs and cost-income ratios than conventional banks (columns 4 and 5).  
Specifically, we find a 6.4 percentage point difference in the cost-income ratio between 
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conventional and Islamic banks and a 0.9 percentage difference in overhead costs, both large 
given the means of 62% and 3.5%, respectively. Islamic and conventional banks, however, do 
not show any significant difference in asset quality, as the Islamic bank dummy enters 
insignificantly in the regressions of loss reserves, loan loss provisions and non-performing loans 
(columns 6 to 8).   Finally, Islamic banks are not more stable, not more profitable, and not more 
liquid than conventional banks (columns 9 to 12). Islamic banks, however, have a 2.5 percentage 
point higher capitalization ratio than conventional banks, again a large economic effect, given 
the average of 10.8% in our large sample.  
The other bank-level variables enter with the expected signs. Larger banks rely more on 
non-deposit funding, have lower loan-deposit ratios, lower overhead costs and cost-income 
ratios, lower loss reserves and loan loss provisions, lower liquidity, and lower z-scores due to 
lower profitability and capitalization ratios.  Banks with higher fixed assets rely more on fee 
income, have lower loan-deposit ratios, have higher overhead and cost-income ratios, have 
higher loan losses, loan loss provisions and non-performing loans, and have lower z-scores in 
spite of higher capitalization ratios. Banks with a higher share of other earning assets rely more 
on fee income and have lower loan-deposit ratios, have higher cost-income ratios, have higher 
loss reserves, loan loss provisions and non-performing loans, have higher liquidity reserves, and 
have lower z-scores.  
Many of the country variables enter significantly, explaining differences in business 
orientation, cost efficiency, asset quality and stability.  Banks in richer countries rely less on fee-
based income, but more on non-deposit funding, have higher loan-deposit ratios, have higher 
overhead costs and cost-income ratios, but also higher asset quality; they are more stable due to 
higher capitalization and in spite of lower profitability. Banks in countries with higher levels of 
financial development, on the other hand, rely less on non-deposit funding, have lower loan-
deposit ratios, are more cost-efficient, have lower loss reserves and loan loss provisions, and are 
more stable in spite of lower profitability and capitalization. More concentrated banking systems 
are associated with lower reliance on non-deposit funding, higher cost efficiency, lower loan 
provisions, but higher non-performing loans, higher liquidity reserves and higher z-scores. Banks 
in countries with higher financial freedom indices rely more on fee-based income, have higher 
overhead costs, higher asset quality, higher profitability, but lower capitalization. Finally, GDP 
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growth is positively associated with fee-based income, but negatively with reliance on non-
deposit funding and loan-deposit ratios; banks in faster growing countries are more cost-
efficient, have higher asset quality and liquidity reserves, and are more stable, due to higher 
profitability and higher capitalization.   
The Table 3 Panel B and C results confirm our previous findings, controlling for 
ownership structure and the regulatory and supervisory framework. We lose 28 countries and 
888 banks in these regressions, due to missing observations. As before, we find that Islamic 
banks are more cost efficient and better capitalized than conventional banks, while there are no 
significant differences along the other dimensions. We also find that a higher share of 
government-owned banks is associated with a higher reliance on fee-based income, higher non-
deposit funding, lower overhead costs, higher loss reserves and loan loss provisions, and lower z-
scores, due to lower profitability and capitalization. A higher degree of foreign bank ownership, 
on the other hand, is associated with a higher reliance on fee-based income, but lower reliance on 
non-deposit funding and lower loan-deposit ratios; banking systems that rely more on foreign 
banks, are more cost-effective and have higher liquidity reserves, but are less stable due to lower 
profitability and lower capitalization. The Panel C regressions show that activity restrictions are 
associated with lower fee-based income, lower cost-efficiency, higher asset quality, higher 
maturity mismatch and higher profitability and capitalization. Stronger supervisory powers are 
associated with higher non-deposit funding, higher loan-deposit ratios, lower cost-income ratios 
but higher overhead costs, lower asset quality, lower maturity mismatch and higher profitability 
and capitalization. More stringent capital regulations, finally, are associated with higher non-
deposit funding and loan-deposit ratios, lower cost efficiency, lower loan loss provisions, higher 
maturity mismatch, and higher z-scores.   Controlling for ownership and the indicators of the 
regulatory and supervisory framework, however, does not change our main findings on 
significant efficiency and capitalization differences between Islamic and conventional banks.  
The Table 4 regressions confirm our previous findings using two alternative estimation 
methods.   Specifically, we report estimates using median least squares and robust regressions. 
Both estimation methodologies allow us to control for the effect of outliers and the fact that there 
are few Islamic banks in the sample. While the median least squares regressor minimizes the 
median square of residuals rather than the average and thus reduces the effect of outliers (Clarke, 
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Cull and Fuchs, 2006), the robust estimation technique uses all observations available, but 
assigns different weights to avoid the impact of outliers. Specifically, through an iterative 
process, observations are weighted based on the absolute value of their residuals, with 
observations with large residuals being assigned smaller weights (Cull, Matesova and Shirley, 
2002; Beck, Cull and Jerome, 2005).7 In both cases, however, we cannot cluster on the bank-
level and our standard errors are therefore biased downwards.  
The Panel 4 regressions show many significant differences between Islamic and 
conventional banks, however they are not robust across the two estimation techniques.   
Specifically, the results of the  robust regressions in Panel A suggest that Islamic banks rely 
more on fee-based income, are more cost-effective, have higher loan loss reserves, lower non-
performing loans (significant at 10% level) and show higher profitability and capitalization. The 
results of the median least square regressions in Panel B, on the other hand, show that Islamic 
banks rely less on non-deposit funding, have higher loan-deposit ratios, are more cost-effective, 
have loan loss reserves, are more liquid and have higher capitalization.  If we focus on 
significant findings across both specifications, we see that Table 4 results confirm the higher 
cost-effectiveness of Islamic banks and the higher capitalization that we found in Table 3. In 
addition, both median least square and robust regressions show that Islamic banks have higher 
loan loss reserves.  
In Table 5 Panel A, we interact a measure of the market share of Islamic banks in terms 
of assets with the Islamic bank dummy and a conventional bank dummy.  This specification 
allows us to directly test for differences between the effect of a cross-country variation in the 
importance of Islamic banks on Islamic and conventional banks, reported below the coefficient 
estimates. For ease of presentation, we do not report the other bank- and country-level control 
variables.  The results confirm our previous findings while showing some important variation 
across countries with different market shares for Islamic banks.   We find that conventional 
banks rely more on fee income in countries with a higher share of Islamic banks, suggesting 
either a specialization of conventional banks in fee-based activities or the opening of Islamic 
                                                          
7 Specifically, the robust estimation technique initially eliminates gross outliers based on Cook’s distance exceeding 
the threshold of one. Through an iterative process, weights are calculated based on the absolute residuals, and the 
model is regressed against those weights. The iterations continue until the maximum change in weights drops below 
a pre-specified tolerance level.  See Rousseeuw and Leroy (1987). 
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windows by conventional banks in these countries. In countries with a higher share of Islamic 
banks, such banks rely more on non-deposit funding; this could be explained by higher reliance 
on wholesale funding by Islamic banks at the later stages of such a segment in a financial market. 
In countries with higher shares of Islamic banks, conventional banks exhibit lower loan-deposit 
ratios, while Islamic banks exhibit higher ratios. While we confirm our previous finding of more 
cost-efficient Islamic banks, conventional banks are also more cost-efficient if located in 
countries with a higher share of Islamic banks. Islamic banks hold higher loss reserves if located 
in countries with a very small share of Islamic banks, while conventional banks incur higher non-
performing loans and are less stable in countries with a higher market share for Islamic banks. 
Our previous finding of higher capitalization of Islamic banks is confirmed and does not vary 
across countries with different shares of Islamic banks.  
In Panel B Table 5 we explore more in depth the effect of differing market shares of 
Islamic banks across countries, by focusing on conventional banks. Hence, we drop Islamic 
banks, and investigate the effect of the Islamic Bank Share on business orientation, cost 
efficiency, asset quality and stability of conventional banks. We find that conventional banks in 
countries with higher Islamic bank share have higher fee-based income and lower loan-deposit 
ratios.  They are also more cost-efficient in countries with a higher share of Islamic banks, but 
have lower asset quality, as indicated by higher loss reserves and non-performing loans. Finally, 
they have lower z-scores in countries with higher market shares for Islamic banks. The 
significant differences across conventional banks in countries with different shares of Islamic 
banks point to the importance of focusing on a sample with both Islamic and conventional banks, 
to which we will turn next. These results also suggest that country characteristics (such as the 
overall importance of Islamic banks) might be at least as important as the bank type in explaining 
differences in business orientation, cost efficiency, asset quality and stability. These findings are 
qualitatively confirmed when using robust regressions.  
In Table 6 we focus on a sample of 20 countries that have both conventional and Islamic 
banks. This sample allows us to include country-year-fixed effects and thus avoid that we are 
confounding country- with bank-level differences, as we are effectively comparing conventional 
and Islamic banks within a country and a year. Unlike in our previous regressions, we find that 
Islamic banks are less cost efficient and have lower loss reserves than conventional banks, but 
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they continue to be better capitalized.  Specifically, Islamic banks have a 3.5 percentage point 
higher cost-income ratio and 0.3 percentage points higher overhead costs than conventional 
banks.  This suggests that the earlier finding of more cost efficient Islamic banks was driven by 
an overall higher efficiency in countries with both Islamic and conventional banks. We also find 
that Islamic banks have lower loss reserves than conventional banks in this smaller sample. As in 
the large sample, we find that Islamic banks have a higher capital-asset ratio than conventional 
banks, with the economic size of the effect being 1.2 percentage points. These findings are 
qualitatively confirmed when using robust regressions. 
The results in Table 7 show significant variation in the differences between conventional 
and Islamic banks, across countries and years with different market shares of Islamic banks. Here 
we interact the market share of Islamic banks with both a dummy for Islamic and a dummy for 
conventional banks, a similar specification as in Table 5, but for the smaller sample of countries 
with both conventional and Islamic banks. Given the high correlation between the Islamic bank 
dummy and the Islamic market share, we do not include the bank dummy by itself, as otherwise 
identification would not be possible. We also include the bank- and country-time variant control 
variables, as well as country- and year-fixed effects.8 We find that both Islamic and conventional 
banks reduce their reliance on non-deposit funding as the share of Islamic banks in the market 
increases, with no significant difference between the two bank types.  On the other hand, only 
Islamic banks reduce their loan-deposit ratio as the overall share of Islamic banks increases. Both 
Islamic and conventional banks increase their cost-efficiency, as measured by the cost-income 
ratio, as the share of Islamic banks increases, but this increase is significantly higher for 
conventional than for Islamic banks. Both conventional and Islamic banks increase their 
profitability as the market share for Islamic banks increases, with no significant difference 
between the two bank types. We note that the effects of varying Islamic Bank Share in the 
smaller sample are mostly consistent with the effects that we found for the larger sample in Table 
5, but the significance levels vary across the two samples.    
Summarizing, the only robust difference between Islamic and conventional banks is that 
the former have higher capital-asset ratios.  The higher cost efficiency of Islamic banks that we 
                                                          
8 Unlike in Table 6, we cannot include country-year-fixed effects, as otherwise there would be perfect 
multicollinearity with the sum of the two Islamic Banking Share interaction terms.  
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found in the large sample is driven by the fact that banks in countries with both conventional and 
Islamic banks are cost effective; in these countries, however, it is the conventional banks that are 
more cost-effective. We find some evidence that conventional banks’ asset quality and stability 
deteriorate as the share of Islamic banks increases, while their cost efficiency increases.   
5. Islamic and Conventional Banks during the Crisis 
This section compares the relative performance of conventional and Islamic banks during the 
crisis to test whether one bank type is better positioned to withstand large exogenous financial 
shocks.  Unlike in the previous section, we focus on indicators of asset quality and stability since 
they are more likely to be affected by contagion effects than the business orientation and 
efficiency of financial institutions. In addition, we consider quarterly stock market indicators for 
a sub-sample of listed banks. We focus on the sample period 2005 to 2009 for the financial 
statement indicators and 2005 to 2010 for the stock market indicators.  To control for 
confounding country-level factors in assessing the impact of the global financial crisis, we focus 
again on a sample of countries with both conventional and Islamic banks so that we can include 
country-year fixed effects.   Unlike in the previous section (and due to the different sample 
period) we have 22 countries with 397 conventional and 89 Islamic banks. Out of these 486 
banks, 112 are listed, 74 conventional and 38 Islamic.  
Table 8 provides descriptive statistics on our sample and shows that our sample is not too 
different from the pre-crisis sample. However, we also find a large variation in stability and asset 
quality.  The quarterly stock returns vary from -44% to 72% (over the course of a quarter), with a 
mean of 2.9%. Figure 3 shows the development of quarterly stock returns of both conventional 
and Islamic banks between 2005 and 2010 and shows a close co-movement between the two 
bank types.  
The estimations reported in Table 9 use financial statement indicators to test for a 
differential effect of the crisis on the performance of Islamic and conventional banks. 
Specifically, in addition to the Islamic bank dummy, we include an interaction with a crisis 
dummy for 2008 and 2009 as well as an interaction with a trend variable.  We include the latter 
to distinguish between the effect of the crisis on any difference between Islamic and 
conventional banks and any longer-time trends.  
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The results in Table 9 show little difference between Islamic and conventional banks 
during the crisis.  Specifically, we find no significant differences in asset quality between Islamic 
and conventional banks, neither in general nor during the crisis. We find significantly higher 
liquidity reserves for Islamic banks, though with a decreasing trend over time.   Since the on-set 
of the crisis, however, Islamic banks have shown significantly higher liquidity reserves.  None of 
the stability measures comes in significantly at the 5% level, although we do find some 
marginally significant results: Islamic banks are better capitalized and less profitable.  None of 
these differences, however, varies with the crisis period.  
The Table 10 results show that while Islamic banks yield lower stock returns for their 
investors in general, the reverse held during the crisis. Here, we regress quarterly stock returns 
on an Islamic Bank dummy plus interactions with Crisis (Q4-2007 to Q4-2008) and recovery 
period (Q1 to Q4-2009). In column (2), we also include additional bank characteristics that might 
explain the behavior of stock returns, while in column (3), we add interactions of these bank 
characteristics with the crisis and recovery dummies. Controlling for other bank characteristics 
turns the Islamic bank dummy insignificant, while its interaction with Crisis still enters 
positively, although only at the 10% significance level. Higher liquidity reserves and better 
capitalization can explain higher stock returns.  The column (3) results confirm this finding and 
also show that during the crisis lower provisions, less reliance on non-deposit funding, and 
higher capital-asset ratios boosted stock returns.  These effects can thus explain why the Islamic 
bank dummy and its interaction with crisis and recovery turn insignificant in column (3) of Table 
10. In robustness tests, we find the same results when using robust regressions.
6. Conclusions 
This paper discussed the implications of Sharia-compliant products of Islamic banking for 
agency problems using traditional theory of financial intermediation. While theory suggests 
significant repercussions of the equity-like nature of Islamic banking for business orientation, 
efficiency, risk-taking and stability, anecdotal evidence suggests that Islamic banks’ business 
model might be not too different from conventional banks’ business model. 
Our empirical estimations show little significant differences between Islamic and 
conventional banks.  The tentative conclusion of the cross-country, cross-bank comparison of 
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conventional and Islamic banks is therefore that either opposing effects of Sharia-compliant 
banking cancel each other out or that the differences between these two models are smaller than 
often assumed.  However, there are certainly regulatory and supervisory challenges for countries 
that see an increasing entry of Islamic banks, and our preliminary results suggest that 
conventional banks that operate in countries with a larger share of Islamic banks are more cost-
effective but less stable. 
We hope that our theoretical discussions and empirical findings stimulate more research 
in this area. First, disaggregated data on specific products below balance sheet and income 
statements are necessary to better understand the differences in financial service provisions 
between conventional and Islamic banks. This would also allow us to include Islamic windows 
in our analysis. Second, future work can also assess the impact of varying market shares for 
Islamic banks on the outreach of the banking system and ultimately the access to and use of 
banking products by firms and enterprises.   
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Figure 1.  Number of Islamic banks reporting to Bankscope 1995-2008 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Expansion of Islamic banking 1995-2008 
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Figure 3. Average bank stock return by specialization 1995-2009 
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Table 1. Banking sector structure in "Islamic" countries as of 2007 
In this table we report details of the banking sector structure of  22 countries in Bankscope that host both islamic banks and conventional 
banks.  The sample is restricted to countries that have at least 4 banks reporting to Bankscope and banks with at least two years of 
observations. Islamic Banking % is the islamic banks' share of total banking sector assets.   
 
 
Islamic Banking %
Total Islamic 2007 Non-Islamic Islamic
Brahain 11 15 27.68 5 4
Bangladesh 28 5 13.22 22 5
Cayman Islands 11 1 6.53 0 0
Egypt 23 2 4.22 13 2
Gambia (*) 5 1 8.48 0 1
Indonesia 53 1 0.62 24 0
Jordan 7 2 6.20 7 1
Kuwait 5 6 41.33 5 6
Lebanon 27 2 0.33 3 0
Malaysia 29 12 7.26 3 0
Mauritannia 5 1 12.40 0 0
Pakistan 23 10 6.72 21 6
Qatar 7 4 14.02 5 3
Saudi Arabia 9 2 5.92 8 1
Singapore 12 1 0.17 3 0
Sudan 13 9 33.84 7 4
Syria 8 1 1.05 6 1
Tunisia 14 1 1.51 10 0
Turkey 24 3 2.96 12 2
United Arabe Emirates 16 4 12.86 12 4
United Kingdom 88 2 0.01 0 1
Yemen 4 3 51.45 0 0
Total 422 88 9.87 166 41
(*) We use 2005 Bankscope assets 
(**) We use 2001 Bankscope assets
Number of Banks in 2007 Listed Banks 
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Table 2.  Descriptive statistics 
In this table we report descriptive statistics of the variables used in our analysis for the whole sample and for the sample of countries that host both 
islamic banks and conventional banks.  We also report p-values for the test of difference in means between islamic and conventional  banks.  All 
balance sheet data are from Bankscope , are yearly, and cover the period 1995-2007 (i.e. pre-crisis).  In the whole sample Panel A there are 2956 
banks (that report total assets in Bankscope in 2007) among which 99 are islamic banks. In the "Islamic" countries  sample Panel B (countries that 
host both islamic and non-islamic banks)  there are  406 banks of which 86 are islamic banks. In each sample we include countries that have at least 4 
banks reporting to Bankscope and banks with at least 2 years of observations. Balance sheets data are unconsolidated when available and 
consolidated otherwise. Higher value of the zscore indicates greater stability. Maturity match is measured as the ratio of liquid assets to short-term 
funding.  All ratios are in percentage.  Macroeconomic variables are all from the World Bank (World Development Indicators, Financial 
Development and Structure Database, and Bank Regulation and Supervision database) except for the index of Financial Freedom which is from the 
Heritage Foundation.  The concentration ratio is the share of total banking sector assets held by the largest 3 banks in the country. Islamic Banking % 
is the islamic banks' share of total banking sector assets.  Higher values of the financial freedom index indicate fewer restrictions imposed on banks 
and less direct government involvement in the financial system. Higher values of the activity restrictiveness index indicate greater restriction on 
banks to engage in insurance, securities, and real estate activities. The capital stringency index measures whether there are explicit regulatory 
requirements regarding the amount of capital that a bank must have relative to various guidelines. The supervisory power index measures whether the 
supervisory authorities have the authority to take specific actions to prevent and correct problems (such as restructuring powers and declaring 
insolvency powers). All variables (except the macroeconomic variables) are winsorized at the 1% and 99% level to remove outliers.   
 
 
 
Panel A. Whole Sample 
Scaled by
Number of 
observations Mean Standard deviation Minimum Maximum Islamic Banks 
Conventional 
Banks
Difference 
Test p-value 
Business model 
Fee income Total operational income 15816 32.639 20.284 4.107 69.326 34.423 32.615 0.240
Non-deposit funding Total funding 28995 5.490 9.172 0.000 26.742 3.854 5.517 0.000
Gross Loans Total deposits 28749 71.739 31.524 21.459 125.659 77.384 71.643 0.000
Efficiency
Overheads Total assets 28361 3.480 2.395 0.822 8.282 2.650 3.495 0.000
Cost income ratio 27835 62.002 18.182 33.330 92.490 54.090 62.140 0.000
Assets quality
Loan Loss reserves Total gross loans 21978 4.485 4.050 0.660 13.440 4.765 4.481 0.213
Loan loss provisions Total gross loans  25383 1.344 1.510 -0.008 4.747 1.298 1.345 0.542
Non-performing loans Total gross loans 14747 6.204 6.364 0.379 20.074 6.504 6.200 0.501
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Panel A. Continued  
 
 
Scaled by
Number of 
observations Mean Standard deviation Minimum Maximum Islamic Banks 
Conventional 
Banks
Difference 
Test p-value 
Stability 
Zscore 29015 17.468 13.870 2.676 45.676 16.793 17.480 0.271
Return on assets 29181 1.126 1.109 -0.320 3.340 1.417 1.121 0.000
Equity assets ratio 29465 10.754 6.575 3.650 25.480 13.528 10.705 0.000
Maturity match 29117 36.895 25.912 7.350 87.110 36.726 36.898 0.886
Controls 
Bank level 
ln(total assets) 38422 13.762 1.888 10.959 16.866 13.572 13.766 0.053
Non-loan earnings assets Total earnings assets 38333 44.451 23.462 13.610 85.490 41.737 44.513 0.003
Fixed assets Total assets 37188 1.882 1.712 0.109 5.411 2.288 1.873 0.000
Country level 
ln(GDP per capita) 1812 8.078 1.643 4.442 11.619
GDP growth 1806 4.625 4.521 -18.000 88.958
Concentration ratio 1764 0.685 0.196 0.140 1
Financial freedom index 1859 53.744 19.712 10 90
Private credit GDP ratio 1587 0.505 0.459 0.004 2.114
Islamic Banking % 2086 2.470 12.010 0 100
Government ownership % of banking sector assets 1364 17.006 22.413 0 98.100
Foreign ownership % of banking sector assets 1314 34.738 30.354 0 100
Activity restrictiveness 1502 7.403 2.051 3 12
Overall capital stringency 1272 4.074 1.561 1 7
Official supervisory power 1372 10.982 2.347 4 14
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Panel B. Islamic Countries 
Number of 
observations Mean Standard deviation Minimum Maximum Islamic Banks
Conventional 
Banks
Difference Test p-
value 
Fee income 3114 33.790 19.808 4.107 69.326 36.755 33.515 0.011
Non-deposit funding 6041 2.460 6.398 0.000 26.742 3.241 2.362 0.001
Loans deposits ratio 5961 62.412 28.520 17.782 109.422 61.287 71.440 0.000
Overheads 5695 2.549 1.804 0.822 8.282 3.221 2.454 0.000
Cost income ratio 5531 54.583 19.083 33.330 92.490 55.822 54.412 0.072
Loss reserves 4966 5.772 4.534 0.660 13.440 4.918 5.864 0.000
Loan loss provisions 4837 1.351 1.445 -0.008 4.747 1.284 1.359 0.250
Non-performing loans 3332 8.098 7.050 0.379 20.074 5.944 8.309 0.000
Zscore 6023 17.718 13.326 2.676 45.676 16.700 17.854 0.030
Return on assets 6036 1.290 1.092 -0.320 3.340 1.516 1.259 0.000
Equity assets ratio 6165 11.550 6.812 3.650 25.480 15.355 11.046 0.000
Maturity match 6059 41.535 24.749 7.350 87.110 40.794 41.627 0.000
Controls 
Bank level 
ln(total assets) 6870 13.842 1.691 10.959 16.866 13.572 13.882 0.000
Non-loan earnings assets 6843 46.791 23.401 13.610 85.490 41.737 47.514 0.000
Fixed assets 6581 1.626 1.502 0.109 5.411 2.288 1.528 0.000
Country level 
ln(GDP per capita) 315 8.035 1.528 5.544 10.872
GDP growth 303 4.871 3.252 -13.127 20.843
Concentration ratio 309 0.657 0.190 0.243 1.000
Financial freedom index 322 47.360 21.111 10.000 90.000
Private credit GDP ratio 258 0.537 0.424 0.017 1.896
Islamic Banking % 358 14.390 25.892 0.000 100.000
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Panel C. Correlation matrix among selected variables 
Whole sample 
Islamic 1
Islamic Banking % 0.5347* 1
Fee income 0.0101 0.0356* 1
Non-deposit funding -0.0231* -0.0109 0.0566* 1
Loans deposits ratio 0.0233* -0.0005 -0.1708* 0.3366* 1
Loss reserves 0.0084 0.0559* 0.1379* 0.0035 -0.1955* 1
Loan loss provisions -0.0038 0.0184* 0.0815* 0.0817* -0.0385* 0.5330* 1
Non-performing loans 0.0055 0.0745* 0.0721* -0.1080* -0.2108* 0.7547* 0.4464* 1
Cost income ratio -0.0575* -0.0650* 0.0998* 0.0345* -0.0760* 0.0891* 0.0023 0.1241* 1
Overheads -0.0465* -0.0429* 0.2030* 0.0882* 0.0247* 0.3355* 0.3986* 0.2275* 0.4625* 1
Zscore -0.0065 -0.0448* -0.1451* -0.0783* 0.0881* -0.2178* -0.2481* -0.2205* -0.1369* -0.2340* 1
Return on assets 0.0349* 0.0541* 0.0858* 0.0167* 0.0449* 0.0039 -0.0173* -0.1005* -0.4744* 0.2028* 0.0018 1
Equity assets ratio 0.0561* 0.0118* 0.0326* 0.0194* 0.1471* 0.1717* 0.1612* 0.0808* -0.0425* 0.3885* 0.1324* 0.3803* 1
Maturity match -0.0008 0.0182* 0.2313* -0.0676* -0.4628* 0.2094* 0.0945* 0.1638* 0.0098 0.1157* -0.0114 0.1309* 0.2469* 1
ln(total assets) -0.0151* 0.0052 -0.1025* 0.1021* 0.0564* -0.2554* -0.2208* -0.2563* -0.1469* -0.4661* 0.0664* -0.1979* -0.5109* -0.2532* 1
Non-loan earnings assets -0.0266* -0.0074 0.2071* 0.0123* -0.7592* 0.2307* 0.0615* 0.1893* 0.0270* -0.0170* -0.0454* 0.0251* 0.0608* 0.6491* -0.0788* 1
Fixed assets 0.0302* 0.0668* 0.0794* -0.0088 -0.0043 0.2968* 0.2835* 0.2769* 0.2629* 0.5629* -0.1349* 0.1125* 0.2577* 0.0149* -0.3922* -0.1041*
"Islamic" countries 
Islamic 1
Islamic Banking % 0.3420* 1
Fee income 0.0456* 0.1574* 1
Non-deposit funding 0.0433* 0.1484* 0.0616* 1
Loans deposits ratio 0.1117* 0.0088 0.0472* 0.1573* 1
Loss reserves -0.0619* 0.0296* 0.1046* -0.0803* -0.2275* 1
Loan loss provisions -0.0162 0.0860* 0.0871* 0.0224 -0.0614* 0.4606* 1
Non-performing loans -0.0956* -0.0347* -0.017 -0.0271 -0.1443* 0.7936* 0.4214* 1
Cost income ratio 0.0242 0.0324* 0.1144* 0.0119 -0.1885* 0.0909* -0.0449* 0.2102* 1
Overheads 0.1404* 0.2566* 0.0920* 0.0175 0.0184 0.0904* 0.2048* 0.0683* 0.4939* 1
Zscore -0.0279* -0.1188* -0.2473* -0.0324* -0.0450* -0.1858* -0.1870* -0.1956* -0.1331* -0.1366* 1
Return on assets 0.0760* 0.1225* -0.0415* -0.0136 0.1766* -0.1315* -0.2298* -0.2904* -0.5628* 0.0438* 0.1305* 1
Equity assets ratio 0.2033* 0.0933* -0.1597* 0.0687* 0.1804* 0.0142 -0.0195 -0.0616* -0.1491* 0.2116* 0.3069* 0.4388* 1
Maturity match -0.0106 0.0808* -0.0659* 0.0595* -0.4596* 0.1168* 0.0286* 0.0297 0.0161 0.0393* 0.1866* 0.0455* 0.2021* 1
ln(total assets) -0.0896* -0.1054* -0.0104 0.0009 0.0697* -0.2018* -0.1486* -0.1718* -0.2487* -0.3706* 0.0401* -0.0296* -0.3117* -0.1967* 1
Non-loan earnings assets -0.0634* 0.0086 -0.0457* 0.0614* -0.8190* 0.2472* 0.0879* 0.1512* 0.1286* 0.0237 0.1137* -0.0500* 0.0788* 0.5981* -0.1396* 1
Fixed assets 0.1225* 0.2787* -0.0592* -0.0183 -0.0685* 0.1698* 0.1480* 0.1814* 0.3245* 0.4890* -0.0434* 0.0013 0.1567* -0.0116 -0.3487* 0.0066
In this panel we report Pearson correlation coefficients. A star indicates statistical significance at the 5% level and above. 
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Table 3.  Comparing islamic and conventional banks in the whole sample 
In this table we report results for the whole sample not controlling and controlling for banking sector ownership structure.  The standard errors  
clustered by bank are reported in brackets. See Table 2 for a detailed definition of all the variables used in the regression. The sample is an 
unbalanced panel of 2956 banks among which 99 are islamic banks.  The period covered is 1995-2007.   
 
 
Panel A. Baseline specification 
Fee income 
Non-deposit 
funding 
Loans deposit 
ratio
Cost income 
ratio Overheads Loss reserves 
Loan loss 
provisions 
Non-performing 
loans 
Maturity 
match Zscore 
Return on 
assets 
Equity assets 
ratio 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Islamic bank dummy 2.894 -0.34 3.031 -6.362*** -0.924*** 0.077 -0.128 -0.021 2.425 1.278 0.116 2.505***
[2.969] [0.850] [2.241] [1.805] [0.183] [0.445] [0.131] [1.128] [2.013] [1.533] [0.118] [0.805]
ln(total assets) -0.01 0.495*** -1.201*** -1.204*** -0.349*** -0.120*** -0.046*** -0.023 -2.709*** -0.652***-0.047*** -1.900***
[0.228] [0.090] [0.190] [0.151] [0.018] [0.038] [0.011] [0.068] [0.184] [0.140] [0.009] [0.053]
Non-loan earnings assets 0.189*** 0.001 -1.084*** 0.021** -0.002* 0.037*** 0.004*** 0.042*** 0.724*** -0.033*** 0.001 0.008**
[0.016] [0.006] [0.011] [0.010] [0.001] [0.003] [0.001] [0.005] [0.012] [0.008] [0.001] [0.003]
Fixed assets 0.916*** 0.027 -1.574*** 3.166*** 0.591*** 0.438*** 0.143*** 0.574*** 0.053 -0.296** -0.012 0.456***
[0.221] [0.084] [0.195] [0.146] [0.018] [0.037] [0.011] [0.070] [0.173] [0.124] [0.010] [0.055]
ln(GDP per capita) -1.577*** 0.991*** 3.193*** 3.497*** 0.161*** -0.274*** -0.159*** -1.145*** -0.209 1.243***-0.100*** 0.743***
[0.331] [0.127] [0.263] [0.238] [0.026] [0.063] [0.015] [0.112] [0.273] [0.200] [0.014] [0.077]
GDP growth 0.418*** -0.059** -0.185*** -0.361*** -0.068*** -0.191*** -0.092*** -0.317*** 0.260*** 0.160*** 0.032*** 0.030*
[0.076] [0.026] [0.060] [0.053] [0.005] [0.011] [0.004] [0.022] [0.056] [0.038] [0.003] [0.016]
Concentration ratio 1.566 -7.692*** -6.981*** -4.009*** -1.449*** -0.302 -0.604*** 1.465*** 6.428*** 5.788*** -0.014 -0.632
[1.900] [0.712] [1.376] [1.137] [0.138] [0.267] [0.080] [0.490] [1.348] [1.036] [0.069] [0.402]
Financial freedom index 0.147*** -0.001 -0.018 -0.02 0.008*** -0.032*** -0.002** -0.044*** 0.014 0.02 0.003*** -0.011**
[0.022] [0.007] [0.016] [0.014] [0.002] [0.003] [0.001] [0.006] [0.015] [0.013] [0.001] [0.005]
Private credit GDP ratio 1.093 -3.522*** -4.959*** -4.584*** -1.232*** -0.483*** -0.281*** 0.450* 0.02 4.440***-0.265*** -0.467**
[0.971] [0.374] [0.789] [0.605] [0.078] [0.141] [0.045] [0.257] [0.706] [0.562] [0.038] [0.215]
Constant 26.068*** -2.327 118.897*** 49.974*** 7.318*** 8.828*** 4.216*** 15.141*** 38.116*** 9.165*** 2.413*** 29.404***
[3.953] [1.442] [3.054] [2.761] [0.290] [0.637] [0.181] [1.238] [3.112] [2.264] [0.153] [0.921]
Year fixed effects x x x x x x x x x x x x
Number of observations 15816 28995 28749 27835 28361 21978 25383 14747 29117 29015 29181 29465
R-squared 0.07 0.07 0.6 0.13 0.44 0.23 0.18 0.24 0.47 0.1 0.11 0.3
(***) significance at the 1 per cent level, (**) 5 per cent level, (*) 10 per cent level. 
Stability Asset quality Efficiency Business model 
 33
 
Panel B. Controlling for banking sector ownership structure 
Fee income 
Non-deposit 
funding 
Loans deposit 
ratio
Cost income 
ratio Overheads Loss reserves 
Loan loss 
provisions 
Non-performing 
loans 
Maturity 
match Zscore 
Return on 
assets 
Equity assets 
ratio 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Islamic bank dummy 2.660 -1.405 -2.060 -5.887*** -0.879*** 0.927* -0.138 0.906 -0.047 1.462 -0.086 2.203**
[3.693] [0.966] [2.393] [1.962] [0.229] [0.504] [0.181] [1.360] [2.677] [1.860] [0.132] [0.901]
ln(total assets) -0.235 0.456*** -1.399*** -1.356*** -0.356*** -0.090** -0.044*** -0.008 -2.638*** -0.611***-0.040*** -1.867***
[0.241] [0.100] [0.210] [0.157] [0.020] [0.040] [0.012] [0.071] [0.192] [0.155] [0.009] [0.057]
Non-loan earnings assets 0.192*** 0.003 -1.082*** 0.035*** -0.001 0.034*** 0.003*** 0.047*** 0.719*** -0.028*** 0.001** 0.013***
[0.019] [0.006] [0.013] [0.011] [0.001] [0.003] [0.001] [0.005] [0.014] [0.010] [0.001] [0.004]
Fixed assets 1.385*** 0.044 -1.851*** 3.115*** 0.532*** 0.456*** 0.123*** 0.532*** -0.438** -0.211 -0.032*** 0.376***
[0.243] [0.101] [0.228] [0.165] [0.021] [0.040] [0.013] [0.076] [0.189] [0.142] [0.011] [0.062]
ln(GDP per capita) -0.351 1.534*** 4.302*** 3.234*** 0.186*** -0.378*** -0.137*** -1.323*** 0.916*** 1.278***-0.117*** 0.604***
[0.382] [0.158] [0.316] [0.272] [0.030] [0.071] [0.018] [0.129] [0.312] [0.245] [0.016] [0.093]
GDP growth 0.438*** 0.03 -0.157** -0.253*** -0.070*** -0.212*** -0.100*** -0.353*** 0.062 0.141*** 0.030*** -0.005
[0.081] [0.028] [0.064] [0.056] [0.005] [0.011] [0.004] [0.023] [0.059] [0.039] [0.003] [0.017]
Concentration ratio 2.808 -8.023*** -7.591*** -3.615*** -1.335*** 0.329 -0.565*** 1.991*** 7.950*** 5.197*** -0.005 -0.345
[2.086] [0.802] [1.488] [1.212] [0.154] [0.286] [0.090] [0.522] [1.448] [1.197] [0.076] [0.451]
Financial freedom index 0.180*** 0.050*** 0.097*** 0.006 0.006*** -0.028*** -0.002** -0.053*** -0.071*** 0.058*** 0.003*** -0.014**
[0.025] [0.008] [0.019] [0.016] [0.002] [0.003] [0.001] [0.006] [0.017] [0.014] [0.001] [0.005]
Private credit GDP ratio 2.951*** -5.436*** -10.179*** -3.982*** -1.454*** -0.327* -0.308*** 0.685** -2.356*** 2.952***-0.372*** -1.124***
[1.118] [0.455] [0.942] [0.726] [0.089] [0.171] [0.052] [0.297] [0.813] [0.672] [0.044] [0.253]
Government ownership 0.161*** 0.024*** 0.031* 0.018 -0.005*** 0.012*** 0.004*** -0.004 -0.091*** 0 -0.007*** -0.016***
[0.020] [0.008] [0.017] [0.014] [0.002] [0.004] [0.001] [0.007] [0.017] [0.013] [0.001] [0.005]
Foreign ownership 0.047*** -0.052*** -0.137*** -0.031*** -0.008*** -0.002 0 0 0.046*** -0.053***-0.003*** -0.020***
[0.017] [0.006] [0.012] [0.011] [0.001] [0.003] [0.001] [0.005] [0.012] [0.009] [0.001] [0.004]
Constant 10.367** -6.662*** 112.908*** 50.825*** 7.802*** 9.207*** 3.930*** 16.569*** 35.556*** 8.692*** 2.832*** 32.255***
[4.610] [1.705] [3.632] [3.261] [0.341] [0.746] [0.219] [1.481] [3.773] [2.723] [0.183] [1.082]
Year fixed effects x x x x x x x x x x x x
Number of observations 12208 22152 21970 21627 21993 16836 19788 11534 22195 22243 22326 22479
R-squared 0.1 0.1 0.6 0.13 0.43 0.25 0.19 0.26 0.49 0.1 0.11 0.31
(***) significance at the 1 per cent level, (**) 5 per cent level, (*) 10 per cent level. 
Stability Asset quality Efficiency Business model 
In this panel we add as controls the proportions of the host country banking sector assets that are government owned and foreign owned. These data are 
from the World Bank Financial Development and Structure database (2007). 
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Panel C. Controlling for the regulatory and supervisory framework
Fee income 
Non-deposit 
funding 
Loans deposit 
ratio
Cost income 
ratio Overheads Loss reserves 
Loan loss 
provisions 
Non-performing 
loans 
Maturity 
match Zscore 
Return on 
assets 
Equity assets 
ratio 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Islamic bank dummy 3.668 -1.935* 1.398 -5.590** -1.083*** 0.702 -0.406* 0.09 -2.776 1.713 -0.029 3.231***
[4.124] [1.138] [2.673] [2.250] [0.274] [0.599] [0.220] [1.518] [3.310] [2.139] [0.170] [1.147]
ln(total assets) 0.038 0.612*** -1.121*** -1.275*** -0.377*** -0.139*** -0.055*** -0.052 -2.702*** -0.404***-0.056*** -1.908***
[0.235] [0.100] [0.209] [0.164] [0.020] [0.042] [0.012] [0.078] [0.200] [0.151] [0.009] [0.057]
Non-loan earnings assets 0.176*** -0.004 -1.089*** 0.025** -0.004*** 0.033*** 0.002*** 0.044*** 0.732*** -0.015 0.001 0.006
[0.018] [0.006] [0.012] [0.012] [0.001] [0.003] [0.001] [0.006] [0.014] [0.009] [0.001] [0.004]
Fixed assets 0.956*** -0.111 -1.918*** 3.261*** 0.570*** 0.470*** 0.132*** 0.585*** 0.206 -0.22 -0.021** 0.459***
[0.237] [0.099] [0.233] [0.161] [0.020] [0.042] [0.013] [0.080] [0.196] [0.139] [0.011] [0.061]
ln(GDP per capita) -2.962*** 1.085*** 2.723*** 3.201*** 0.164*** -0.448*** -0.177*** -1.334*** -0.979*** 0.643** -0.085*** 0.770***
[0.366] [0.155] [0.320] [0.273] [0.030] [0.074] [0.019] [0.129] [0.329] [0.250] [0.016] [0.092]
GDP growth 0.525*** -0.081*** -0.168** -0.238*** -0.074*** -0.215*** -0.108*** -0.344*** 0.214*** 0.249*** 0.025*** -0.019
[0.084] [0.027] [0.068] [0.058] [0.006] [0.012] [0.004] [0.024] [0.060] [0.041] [0.004] [0.018]
Concentration ratio -1.219 -8.602*** -6.127*** -3.985*** -1.226*** 0.361 -0.589*** 2.124*** 9.368*** 7.019*** 0.103 0.088
[2.081] [0.837] [1.559] [1.309] [0.149] [0.309] [0.094] [0.624] [1.536] [1.176] [0.075] [0.466]
Financial freedom index 0.141*** 0.002 -0.004 -0.051*** 0.003* -0.038*** -0.004*** -0.060*** 0.023 0.026* 0.004*** -0.012**
[0.024] [0.008] [0.017] [0.015] [0.002] [0.003] [0.001] [0.006] [0.016] [0.014] [0.001] [0.005]
Private credit GDP ratio 2.366** -4.608*** -5.713*** -2.278*** -1.113*** -0.302* -0.262*** 0.732** 0.786 4.731***-0.289*** -0.537**
[0.995] [0.425] [0.864] [0.649] [0.084] [0.160] [0.051] [0.300] [0.756] [0.587] [0.040] [0.232]
Activity restrictiveness index -1.548*** 0.095 0.142 0.364*** 0.060*** -0.154*** -0.025** -0.171*** -1.433*** -0.182 0.032*** 0.130***
[0.206] [0.075] [0.154] [0.135] [0.015] [0.030] [0.010] [0.064] [0.149] [0.124] [0.008] [0.046]
Supervisory power index 0.018 0.246*** 0.759*** -0.789*** 0.042*** 0.143*** 0.056*** 0.099** 0.747*** -0.058 0.054*** 0.198***
[0.168] [0.066] [0.166] [0.106] [0.013] [0.026] [0.008] [0.047] [0.117] [0.095] [0.006] [0.035]
Capital regulation stringency index -0.107 0.683*** 0.386*** 0.327** 0.052*** 0.019 -0.022** 0.042 -1.014*** 0.469*** -0.009 -0.007
[0.207] [0.076] [0.139] [0.149] [0.016] [0.037] [0.010] [0.071] [0.176] [0.130] [0.009] [0.050]
Constant 48.239*** -10.984*** 113.066*** 57.765*** 6.666*** 10.017*** 4.260*** 17.660*** 49.969*** 9.250*** 1.642*** 26.226***
[5.571] [2.128] [4.460] [3.691] [0.410] [0.886] [0.266] [1.597] [4.341] [3.319] [0.222] [1.259]
Year fixed effects x x x x x x x x x x x x
Number of observations 12512 21611 21428 20684 21054 15977 18930 10527 21656 21588 21704 21937
R-squared 0.1 0.1 0.6 0.13 0.46 0.28 0.2 0.29 0.5 0.09 0.13 0.32
(***) significance at the 1 per cent level, (**) 5 per cent level, (*) 10 per cent level. 
Business model Asset quality Efficiency Stability 
In this panel we add as controls the country-level indices of the stringency of capital regulation, bank supervisor power,  and activity restrictiveness of banks. 
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Table 4.  Robust and Median regressions   
In this table we report robust and median regression for the baseline specification. See Table 3 for details of the sample covered and Table 2 for 
definitions of the variables used in the regression.  
 
 
Panel A. Robust regressions 
Fee income 
Non-deposit 
funding (#)
Loans deposit 
ratio
Cost income 
ratio Overheads 
Loss 
reserves 
Loan loss 
provisions 
Non-
performing 
loans 
Maturity 
match Zscore 
Return on 
assets 
Equity assets 
ratio 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Islamic bank dummy 3.189** - -0.022 -6.991*** -1.048*** 0.381** -0.058 -0.593* 0.576 0.08 2.117*** 5.336***
[1.482] [0.646] [0.845] [0.074] [0.188] [0.053] [0.359] [0.624] [0.050] [0.244] [0.786]
ln(total assets) 0.016 - -0.581*** -1.247*** -0.306*** -0.044*** 0.017*** 0.169*** -0.606*** -0.037*** -1.735*** -2.913***
[0.115] [0.056] [0.074] [0.007] [0.016] [0.004] [0.030] [0.055] [0.004] [0.021] [0.068]
Non-loan earnings assets 0.211*** - -1.173*** 0.024*** -0.003*** 0.030*** -0.001*** 0.027*** -0.036*** 0 0.002 0.866***
[0.008] [0.004] [0.005] [0.000] [0.001] [0.000] [0.002] [0.004] [0.000] [0.001] [0.004]
Fixed assets 1.003*** - -1.182*** 3.528*** 0.715*** 0.493*** 0.146*** 0.590*** -0.358*** -0.009** 0.636*** 0.079
[0.113] [0.057] [0.076] [0.007] [0.015] [0.005] [0.030] [0.056] [0.004] [0.022] [0.069]
ln(GDP per capita) -1.644*** - 1.946*** 3.831*** 0.125*** -0.282*** -0.175*** -1.187*** 0.996*** -0.116*** 0.704*** 0.067
[0.179] [0.088] [0.117] [0.010] [0.024] [0.007] [0.045] [0.087] [0.007] [0.034] [0.106]
GDP growth 0.519*** - -0.165*** -0.431*** -0.071*** -0.208*** -0.107*** -0.406*** 0.183*** 0.051*** 0.045*** 0.234***
[0.056] [0.028] [0.038] [0.003] [0.007] [0.002] [0.014] [0.028] [0.002] [0.011] [0.034]
Concentration ratio 1.552* - -2.134*** -4.420*** -1.288*** -0.223* -0.346*** 1.857*** 6.369*** -0.002 -0.759*** 5.995***
[0.914] [0.439] [0.581] [0.052] [0.123] [0.035] [0.239] [0.433] [0.035] [0.170] [0.531]
Financial freedom index 0.165*** - 0.038*** -0.026*** 0.008*** -0.026*** -0.001 -0.048*** 0.029*** 0.004*** -0.008*** 0.021***
[0.012] [0.006] [0.008] [0.001] [0.002] [0.000] [0.003] [0.006] [0.000] [0.002] [0.007]
Private credit GDP ratio 0.919* - -2.505*** -4.910*** -1.130*** -0.438*** -0.236*** 0.616*** 4.898*** -0.231*** -0.460*** -0.109
[0.499] [0.250] [0.330] [0.029] [0.067] [0.020] [0.123] [0.245] [0.020] [0.096] [0.302]
Constant 22.924*** - 112.487*** 46.486*** 6.731*** 7.168*** 2.739*** 12.924*** 8.574*** 2.455*** 28.492*** 35.435***
[2.106] [1.036] [1.376] [0.123] [0.279] [0.082] [0.517] [1.019] [0.081] [0.399] [1.250]
Year fixed effects x x x x x x x x x x x x
Number of observations 15816 - 28749 27835 28361 21978 25383 14747 29015 29181 29465 29117
R-squared 0.08 0.78 0.13 0.53 0.23 0.24 0.25 0.09 0.11 0.29 0.61
(***) significance at the 1 per cent level, (**) 5 per cent level, (*) 10 per cent level. 
(#) Cook's distance exceeds 1 for all observations. There is no outlier. 
Business model Efficiency Asset quality Stability 
 36
 
  
Panel B. Median regressions 
Fee income 
Non-deposit 
funding 
Loans deposit 
ratio
Cost income 
ratio Overheads 
Loss 
reserves 
Loan loss 
provisions 
Non-
performing 
loans 
Maturity 
match Zscore 
Return on 
assets 
Equity assets 
ratio 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Islamic bank dummy 1.170 -0.221*** 1.552*** -8.395*** -1.056*** 0.574*** -0.036 -0.397 4.331*** -0.324 0.026 1.410***
[1.702] [0.037] [0.447] [0.998] [0.079] [0.160] [0.044] [0.344] [0.844] [0.735] [0.045] [0.226]
ln(total assets) 0.203 0.111*** -0.632*** -1.105*** -0.290*** -0.035*** -0.001 0.104*** -2.799*** -0.502*** -0.031*** -1.531***
[0.132] [0.003] [0.039] [0.087] [0.007] [0.013] [0.004] [0.028] [0.073] [0.065] [0.004] [0.020]
Non-loan earnings assets 0.221*** -0.002*** -1.116*** 0.036*** -0.004*** 0.023*** 0.001** 0.021*** 0.910*** -0.042*** -0.000* -0.002*
[0.009] [0.000] [0.003] [0.006] [0.000] [0.001] [0.000] [0.002] [0.005] [0.004] [0.000] [0.001]
Fixed assets 0.855*** 0.038*** -0.821*** 4.091*** 0.762*** 0.452*** 0.181*** 0.538*** 0.097 -0.357*** 0.008* 0.636***
[0.130] [0.003] [0.040] [0.089] [0.007] [0.013] [0.004] [0.029] [0.074] [0.066] [0.004] [0.020]
ln(GDP per capita) -1.893*** 0.012** 1.758*** 4.446*** 0.098*** -0.317*** -0.184*** -1.150*** -0.219* 0.708*** -0.153*** 0.548***
[0.206] [0.005] [0.061] [0.139] [0.011] [0.021] [0.006] [0.043] [0.114] [0.102] [0.006] [0.032]
GDP growth 0.684*** -0.001 -0.146*** -0.549*** -0.072*** -0.174*** -0.089*** -0.415*** 0.295*** 0.208*** 0.060*** 0.064***
[0.064] [0.002] [0.020] [0.045] [0.004] [0.006] [0.002] [0.014] [0.037] [0.033] [0.002] [0.010]
Concentration ratio 1.138 -0.651*** -1.472*** -4.922*** -1.205*** -0.064 -0.272*** 2.205*** 5.332*** 6.278*** -0.017 -1.207***
[1.052] [0.025] [0.304] [0.687] [0.055] [0.105] [0.029] [0.229] [0.571] [0.511] [0.031] [0.157]
Financial freedom index 0.216*** -0.002*** 0.013*** -0.043*** 0.009*** -0.022*** -0.002*** -0.050*** 0.040*** 0.025*** 0.006*** 0.004**
[0.014] [0.000] [0.004] [0.009] [0.001] [0.001] [0.000] [0.003] [0.007] [0.007] [0.000] [0.002]
Private credit GDP ratio -1.101* -0.045*** -2.426*** -5.591*** -1.012*** -0.366*** -0.187*** 0.493*** -0.013 5.608*** -0.175*** -0.491***
[0.574] [0.014] [0.173] [0.389] [0.031] [0.057] [0.016] [0.118] [0.324] [0.289] [0.018] [0.089]
Constant 19.388*** -0.916*** 111.310*** 39.347*** 6.428*** 6.822*** 2.858*** 13.653*** 33.828*** 7.640*** 2.426*** 26.048***
[2.424] [0.060] [0.718] [1.627] [0.130] [0.238] [0.069] [0.496] [1.343] [1.201] [0.073] [0.370]
Year fixed effects x x x x x x x x x x x x
Number of observations 15816 28995 28749 27835 28361 21978 25383 14747 29117 29015 29181 29465
(***) significance at the 1 per cent level, (**) 5 per cent level, (*) 10 per cent level. 
Business model Efficiency Asset quality Stability 
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Table 5.  Consequences of Islamic banking expansion on incumbent conventional banks 
In this table we condition the differences between Islamic and non-Islamic to vary with the size of Islamic banking activities in the country where the 
banks operate.  In panel B we restrict the sample to include only conventional banks. We report standard errors clustered by bank in brackets. See 
Table 2 for a definition of all the variables used in the regression and Table 3 for a description of the sample covered.  
 
 
  
Fee income 
Non-deposit 
funding 
Loans deposit 
ratio
Cost income 
ratio Overheads 
Loss 
reserves 
Loan loss 
provisions 
Non-
performing 
loans 
Maturity 
match Zscore 
Return on 
assets 
Equity 
assets ratio 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Panel A. Interaction with Islamic Banking share
Islamic bank dummy 3.243 -1.818** -2.168 -7.058*** -0.974*** 1.068** -0.089 0.895 -0.381 2.777 -0.022 2.830***
[3.581] [0.868] [2.418] [1.993] [0.220] [0.477] [0.172] [1.176] [2.676] [2.223] [0.140] [1.034]
(1) Islamic Banking %*Islamic dummy 0.004 0.046** 0.156*** 0.008 0.000 -0.038*** -0.001 -0.050 0.088* -0.050 0.005 -0.011
[0.073] [0.018] [0.053] [0.061] [0.005] [0.011] [0.003] [0.043] [0.050] [0.032] [0.003] [0.022]
(2) Islamic Banking %*Non-Islamic dummy 0.302*** -0.018 -0.155*** -0.289*** -0.030*** 0.056** 0.004 0.122*** -0.001 -0.050** 0.005 -0.017
[0.108] [0.026] [0.048] [0.071] [0.007] [0.022] [0.005] [0.028] [0.062] [0.020] [0.003] [0.017]
P-value test (1)=(2) 0.022 0.047 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.371 0.001 0.258 0.992 0.877 0.849
Number of observations 15816 28995 28749 27835 28361 21978 25383 14747 29117 29015 29181 29465
R-squared 0.08 0.07 0.60 0.13 0.44 0.24 0.18 0.24 0.47 0.10 0.11 0.3
Islamic Banking % 0.304*** -0.018 -0.158*** -0.287*** -0.030*** 0.055** 0.004 0.121*** -0.002 -0.050** 0.005 -0.018
[0.109] [0.026] [0.049] [0.072] [0.007] [0.022] [0.005] [0.028] [0.062] [0.020] [0.004] [0.017]
Year FE x x x x x x x x x x x x
Number of observations 15610 28515 28269 14546 27358 28229 21659 24991 27859 28639 28513 28674
R-squared 0.08 0.07 0.60 0.25 0.13 0.66 0.24 0.19 0.44 0.48 0.10 0.11
(***) significance at the 1 per cent level, (**) 5 per cent level, (*) 10 per cent level. 
Asset quality Stability Business model 
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Table 6.  Comparing islamic and conventional banks in "Islamic" countries 
In this table we report results for the sample of countries that host both islamic and  conventional banks.  Hence the specification includes 
country*year fixed effects exploiting within countries variations only.  The sample includes 406 banks among which 86 are islamic banks.  The 
period covered is 1995-2007. See Table 2 for a definition of all the variables used.   
 
 
 
 
  
Fee income 
Non-deposit 
funding 
Loans deposit 
ratio
Cost income 
ratio Overheads 
Loss 
reserves 
Loan loss 
provisions 
Non-
performing 
loans 
Maturity 
match Zscore 
Return on 
assets 
Equity 
assets ratio 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Islamic  bank dummy -2.893 -0.268 2.233 3.494** 0.313* -1.081*** -0.113 -1.386 0.343 0.070 -0.127 1.218**
[2.937] [0.688] [1.479] [1.557] [0.170] [0.414] [0.110] [0.885] [1.702] [1.541] [0.087] [0.576]
ln(total assets) 0.181 -0.074 -1.530*** -0.947** -0.241*** -0.175* -0.004 -0.121 -3.176*** -0.462 -0.095*** -2.318***
[0.567] [0.122] [0.368] [0.415] [0.038] [0.098] [0.026] [0.205] [0.455] [0.382] [0.020] [0.139]
Non-loan earnings assets 0.032 -0.009 -1.016*** 0.015 -0.003 0.033*** 0.006** 0.031** 0.626*** 0.058*** 0.000 0.006
[0.038] [0.010] [0.023] [0.025] [0.003] [0.006] [0.002] [0.012] [0.031] [0.021] [0.001] [0.010]
Fixed assets -0.316 -0.099 -1.675*** 3.420*** 0.356*** 0.131 0.042 0.412** -1.223*** 0.488 -0.066*** 0.439***
[0.486] [0.120] [0.372] [0.381] [0.040] [0.102] [0.026] [0.210] [0.433] [0.317] [0.023] [0.133]
Constant 27.197*** 7.862*** 142.124*** 49.968*** 4.677*** 8.896*** 0.813* 3.001 68.539*** 25.054***3.895*** 47.951***
[8.637] [2.812] [6.853] [7.115] [0.570] [2.312] [0.476] [3.533] [7.212] [5.961] [0.360] [2.240]
Country*Year FE x x x x x x x x x x x x
Number of observations 3114 6041 5961 5531 5695 4966 4837 3332 6059 6023 6036 6165
R-squared 0.33 0.27 0.75 0.3 0.47 0.44 0.31 0.35 0.53 0.22 0.3 0.44
(***) significance at the 1 per cent level, (**) 5 per cent level, (*) 10 per cent level. 
Asset quality Efficiency Stability Business model 
 39
Table 7. Systemic impact of islamic banking 
Islamic banking is the share of total banking sector assets owned by Islamic banks.  Standard errors clustered by bank are reported in brackets.  See 
Table 2 for a definition of the variables used in the estimation. The sample covers countries that host both islamic and conventional banks in the 
period 1995-2007. All specifications include country and year fixed effects. The time-varying control variables included are GDP per capita, GDP 
growth, the concentration ratio (assets held by the largest 3 banks in the country), the financial freedom index, and the bank credit GDP ratio. We 
include the same bank level controls as in Table 6.  
 
 
 
  
Fee income 
Non-deposit 
funding 
Loans 
deposit ratio
Cost income 
ratio Overheads 
Loss 
reserves 
Loan loss 
provisions 
Non-
performing 
loans 
Maturity 
match Zscore 
Return on 
assets 
Equity assets 
ratio 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
(1) Islamic Banking %*Islamic bank dummy 0.024 -0.147** -0.180*** -0.483*** 0.012 -0.061* 0.020* -0.157 -0.144 -0.047 0.019** 0.019
[0.298] [0.072] [0.025] [0.123] [0.012] [0.035] [0.012] [0.101] [0.160] [0.096] [0.008] [0.043]
(2) Islamic Banking %*Non-Islamic bank dummy 0.241 -0.159*** -0.116 -0.653*** 0.000 -0.011 0.022** -0.042 -0.264* -0.003 0.025*** -0.007
[0.195] [0.059] [0.076] [0.116] [0.011] [0.031] [0.011] [0.058] [0.138] [0.086] [0.008] [0.036]
P-value (1)=(2) 0.414 0.789 0.455 0.027 0.220 0.099 0.862 0.219 0.265 0.332 0.169 0.353
Bank controls x x x x x x x x x x x x
Country time-varying controls x x x x x x x x x x x x
Country FE x x x x x x x x x x x x
Year FE x x x x x x x x x x x x
Number of observations 2279 4413 5961 3972 4080 3614 3502 2360 4433 4397 4405 4512
R-squared 0.27 0.23 0.75 0.20 0.39 0.43 0.24 0.29 0.50 0.20 0.18 0.36
(***) significance at the 1 per cent level, (**) 5 per cent level, (*) 10 per cent level. 
Asset quality Efficiency Stability Business model 
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Table 8.  Descriptive statistics 
This table reports descriptive statistics of variables explored in the subsequent analysis of the effect of the global crisis on bank stability and 
performance.  The sample covers 21 countries that host both islamic and conventional banks over the period 2005-2010. The stock return is quarterly 
from Datastream. The sample includes 486 banks of which 112 are listed banks. The sample includes 89 islamic banks of which 38 are listed. See 
Table 2 for a detailed definition of all the variables.  
 
 
 
  
Number of 
observations Mean Standard deviation Min Max 
Return on assets 2124 1.417 1.143 -0.320 3.340
Equity assets ratio 2148 12.499 7.044 3.650 25.480
Zscore 2123 18.737 13.431 2.676 45.676
Nondeposits funding 2107 1.773 5.421 0.000 26.742
Loans deposits ratio 2070 64.005 28.104 19.282 110.487
Maturity match 2098 40.834 25.174 7.350 87.110
Non-performing loans 1336 5.903 6.103 0.379 20.074
Loss reserves 1767 4.705 4.139 0.660 13.440
Loss provisions 1716 1.217 1.412 -0.008 4.747
ln(total assets) 2148 14.265 1.614 10.959 16.866
Stock returns 2016 2.863 21.658 -43.652 71.592
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Table 9.  Islamic versus conventional banks:  Performance and stability during the global crisis 
In this table we compare the performance and soundness of islamic banks and conventional banks during the crisis. All specifications include 
country*year fixed effects. The sample period is 2005-2009. See Table 2 for a definition of all the variables. Standard errors clustered by bank are 
reported in brackets.  
 
 
Return on 
assets 
Equity 
assets ratio Zscore
Loans deposit 
ratio
Maturity 
match 
Non-
performing 
loans 
Loss 
reserves 
Loss 
provisions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
(1) Islamic bank dummy -0.276* 1.877* 1.805 2.585 7.117** -1.211 -0.994 0.154
[0.163] [0.970] [2.364] [2.929] [3.212] [1.030] [0.645] [0.229]
(2) Islamic bank dummy*Crisis -0.100 0.696 -1.249 -1.623 6.424** -0.509 0.723 0.473*
[0.183] [0.981] [2.543] [2.611] [3.224] [1.129] [0.797] [0.271]
Islamic bank dummy*Trend 0.073 -0.578 -0.602 -0.161 -3.112** -0.135 -0.059 -0.132
[0.071] [0.393] [1.007] [1.256] [1.354] [0.447] [0.305] [0.097]
ln(total assets) -0.036 -2.452*** -0.49 -1.239** -3.341*** -0.259 -0.229* 0.048
[0.029] [0.173] [0.482] [0.611] [0.597] [0.244] [0.124] [0.036]
Non-loan earnings assets 0.003 0.017 0.069** -0.969*** 0.609*** 0.032** 0.033*** 0.003
[0.002] [0.011] [0.030] [0.037] [0.040] [0.015] [0.008] [0.003]
Fixed assets -0.055 0.508*** 0.254 -1.251** -0.803 0.205 0.183 0.082*
[0.034] [0.174] [0.459] [0.579] [0.713] [0.273] [0.140] [0.042]
Constant 3.542*** 52.600*** 26.900*** 133.719*** 67.402*** 5.874 5.786*** -0.122
[0.475] [3.006] [8.228] [9.909] [9.891] [4.112] [2.134] [0.635]
Test (1)+(2)=0 0.191 0.128 0.896 0.834 0.009 0.259 0.819 0.123
Country*Year FE x x x x x x x x
Number of observations 2124 2148 2123 2070 2098 1336 1767 1716
R-squared 0.35 0.51 0.19 0.71 0.53 0.37 0.44 0.28
(***) significance at the 1 per cent level, (**) 5 per cent level, (*) 10 per cent level. 
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Table 10. Islamic versus conventional banks: Stock market performance during the crisis 
The dependent variable is the quarterly stock return. The sample covers countries that host Islamic banking and 
conventional banking activities in the period Q1-2005 to Q4-2009. Crisis is a dummy that takes value 1 in the 
period Q4-2007 to Q4-2008 and recovery is a dummy that takes value one in 2009. Standard errors clustered by 
bank are reported in brackets. See Table 2 for a definition of all variables. All control variables are lagged by 
one year (4 quarters). 
 
(1) (2) (3)
(1) Islamic bank dummy -3.319** -1.154 1.704
[1.352] [1.301] [1.475]
(2) Islamic bank dummy*Crisis 4.951** 4.059* -2.015
[2.016] [2.174] [2.757]
(3) Islamic bank dummy*Recovery 1.17 -0.613 -2.888
[1.684] [1.852] [2.190]
Maturity match 0.088*** 0.133***
[0.025] [0.048]
Maturity match*Crisis 0.038
[0.101]
Maturity match*Recovery -0.155
[0.105]
Loans-deposits ratio 0.014 0.023*
[0.008] [0.012]
Loans-deposits ratio*Crisis -0.02
[0.014]
Loans deposits ratio*Recovery 0.018
[0.017]
Provisions -0.456 3.279*
[0.575] [1.958]
Provisions*Crisis -6.443***
[2.210]
Provisions*Recovery -3.889*
[2.031]
ln(total assets) 0.37 0.813
[0.350] [0.509]
ln(total assets)*Crisis 0.243
[0.228]
ln(total assets)*Recovery -0.677
[0.876]
NonDepositFunding 0.03 0.274*
[0.047] [0.143]
NonDepositFunding*Crisis -0.391**
[0.153]
NonDepositFunding*Recovery -0.286*
[0.147]
Equity capital ratio -0.005 -0.045
[0.064] [0.102]
Equity capital ratio*Crisis 0.615***
[0.183]
Equity capital ratio*Recovery -0.094
[0.138]
Constant 28.630*** 20.038*** 7.156
[3.569] [7.341] [10.055]
Tests p-values 
(1)+(2)=0 0.208 0.069 0.892
(1)+(3)=0 0.085 0.211 0.452
Country*Year FE x x x
Number of observations 2016 1636 1387
R-squared 0.28 0.3 0.31
(***) significance at the 1 per cent level, (**) 5 per cent level, (*) 10 per cent level. 
